Volume 11
Issue 4 Fall 1971
Fall 1971

A Proposal for Participating in Natural Resource Development
Starting with the High Seas
Daniel James Edwards

Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Edwards, A Proposal for Participating in Natural Resource Development Starting with the High
Seas, 11 Nat. Resources J. 636 (1971).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol11/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

A PROPOSAL FOR PARTICIPATING IN NATURAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT STARTING
WITH THE HIGH SEAS
DANIEL JAMES EDWARDSt
A new colonial fight over the ownership of natural resources in
and under the high seas could arise if present trends and institutions
continue to prevail. Some of the reasons for past, present, and future
problems in the exploration and development of natural resources
may be illustrated by considering one economic aspect of petroleum.
With petroleum, the difference between the cost of the least expensive oil and the price received for that oil is quite substantial.
Economists define this difference as a "rent" (and then proceed to
ponder which type of rent it is). As stated by Adelman "rents by
their nature are upsetting because they form a large area for appropriation and for disagreement."' This article starts with a proposal to accomplish both the efficient and the equitable distribution
of the natural resources from the sea. Previously, studies2 and
speeches3 have urged development of new "rules of the game" without providing any general framework for developing these guidelines.
This article proposes the creation of a new technique which economists prefer to call an adjustment mechanism. The proposal could be
formalized into an organization or simply used as the guidelines for a
single or a group of projects. The reader is alerted that the proposal is
sketched with a van Gogh disrespect for detail.
A SHORT SUMMARY OF SOME BASIC PROBLEM AREAS
The first fundamental problem for the development of the natural
resources in and under the high seas arises out of the absence of
"Visiting Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park,
Maryland.
1. M. Adelman, The World Oil Outlook in Natural Resources and International Development at 32, 77 (M. Clawson ed. 1964). The reader is cautioned, however, about this
contribution by Adelman because he wrote the following on February 5, 1970: "1 am a bit
sorry you spent the time to go through my essay in the Clawson volume. There are things
there that I would now not accept, but even more important, I think it was very awkwardly
written." One may want to analyze the difference between this quoted essay and Adelman's
forthcoming The World Petroleum Market, supported by Resources for the Future.
2. Brooks, Ocean Mining: Potentialand Economic Consequences, Technology Rev. 22-29
(July/Aug. 1969); Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Seventeenth Report of
New Dimensions for the United Nations: The Problems of the Next Decade, 1966. Nineteenth Report of the United Nations and the Bed of the Sea. 1969.
3. 115 Cong. Rec. 35902 (1969) (remarks of Senator Pell, S. Res. 291 -Submission of a
Resolution Urging the Need to Reach a Multilateral Agreement Relating to Precise Continental Shelf Boundary); 116 Cong. Rec. 5370 (1970) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
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clearly defined rules of the ownership rights to the high seas. In
discussing the "seventies" The Oil and Gas Journal articulated the
issues in their area of interest as follows:
As the technology is developed to tackle the ultra-depths, a big
unanswered question remains-who owns the reserves on the high
seas? Do they belong to those nations with the technology to tap
them? Or should they be shared by all nations? This is a question
which will have to be answered in the coming decade. 4
The problem, however, is more complex than these questions. For
example, equality in output distribution would probably call for
some discussion on the desired production levels, but more important, it could raise the difficult problems of attracting the required capital resources for exploration and development. Thus, an
adjustment mechanism is needed to balance considerations of equity
among nations against desired economic efficiency in its many
dimensions.
For a number of reasons this article primarily illustrates its points
about natural resources with discussions about oil. Oil's economic
value is six times that of the next most valuable resource, magnesium, taken from the sea.' Its economic rent is the greatest of any
natural resource; it has the richest literature; it is currently an area of
intense interest; and oil represents about 60 percent of ocean shipment by weight. However, the ideas have general applicability to all
natural resources, and oil is used in the hope of pedagogical efficiency.
THE PROPOSAL: AN ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM
FOR EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
The financing of the United States supersonic transport (SST)
program was confronted with similar problems of efficiency and
equity as those being considered here with natural resources. A proposal was made for the SST program, which applied the principle of
compound interest, to solve these problems. 6 That proposal took
explicit account of the fact that a dollar invested early in a program
has more value (or reflects a greater foregone alternative) than a
dollar invested later. It would be unfair, all other aspects being the
same, if one investor furnished the first half of the total investment
before the second investor put up a cent and then the later investor
wanted a 50-50 split of potential profits. However, when recognition
4. Forecastfor the Seventies, 67 Oil & Gas J. 160, 202 (1969).
5. Fulbright, supra note 3.
6. Stockfisch and Edwards, The Blending of Public and PrivateEnterprise: The SST as a
Case in Point, 14 Pub. Interest, 108-117 (1969).
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is given to the "time-weighted" value of money by escalating the first
investment relative to the second investment by an appropriate opportunity cost, calculated by use of a market interest rate, then an
approximation can be made of the two relative economic investments. The distribution of profits would then favor the first investor
and the magnitude of this shift would depend upon both the selected
interest rate as well as the duration of time involved. The proposal
for natural resources is a refinement of that original SST adjustment
mechanism, which induces private investment and then distributes
profits between the private and public sectors. The proposed refinement distributes part of production or profits to non-investors. The
original SST distribution of investment and "equity rights" is
illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1.-Illustration of Time-Weighted Equity Device

Year

Nominal
investment

Total
Nominal
share
Gov't

1
2
3
4
5

Future
worth
factor*
Private

(@ 20 percent)

Gov't

2
3
5
5
10

4.300
3.583
2.986
2.488
2.074

$ 77
97
134
112
83

$ 20
30
50
50
50

$ 18
27
45
45
40

6

100

50

50

1.728

7
8

300
200

0
0

300
200

1.440
1.200

$225
26

9
Total

$

Economic worth
(FW X nominal
investment)

86

Private
$

9
11
15
12
21

86

-

432
240

$575

$589

$826

74

42

58

0
$800

Percentage share

*Value of $1 at 20 percent compound interest for (9-t) years.

In Table 1 the nominal investment of the government is 26 percent while an estimate of the economic vorth of the investment is 42
percent of total investment. The difference between 26 and 42 results from the action of the interest-rate calculation (future worth
factor).
Any investment in natural resource exploration and development
has a slightly greater risk, at least in each new phase, than a "normal"
industrial investment. Nevertheless, every industrial investment has
its own significant risk aspects; for example, sudden and unexpected
changes in tastes, technology, supplies, and aggregate demand have
made almost routine industrial investments either completely un-
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profitable, or unprofitable for a long period of time. After an exploration and development idea has been shown to warrant an investment capital must be attracted to it. Investors must expect a "normal
rate of profit" plus another margin for assumed additional risk over a
so-called "normal" investment. The separation of the risk calculation
from the normal interest rate becomes important in this proposal, as
will be illustrated later. A shadow area, prevails over specifying these
values with accuracy but reasonable transactors in the capital
markets could develop flexible guidelines. A long list of rules for
such calculations is recognized.
Once risk capital is attracted, then the question of equitable redistribution of income and wealth becomes a challenge. This ethical
question can be approached by allocating some percentage of output,
such as five or ten percent to the world community. These details
can be administered in many ways. The definition of "world community" is another matter. Because this is an issue in equity, the distribution should be on the basis of population or the reciprocal of
per capita income.
Moreover, the really significant amount of redistribution, most
likely, would start when the risk investors had recovered their initial
investment and started earning the specified target rate of return,
which was an average rate of return including any necessary risk
factor. When these target conditions were fulfilled, the international
redistributive share would increase correspondingly. The two participatory groups could be called The Investor Participatory Group
and The World Participatory Group. The first group would respond
to conservative business incentives, and the second group would
represent the international interest in resources that could not be
appropriated by nations.
PRECURSORS OF PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM
Edith Penrose in her recent book, The Large InternationalFirm In
Developing Countries: The International Petroleum Industry, implicitly developed the historic precursors for this proposal without
actually making the proposal itself. Her presentation covered a broad
range, chronologically and intellectually. She presented examples of
profit-sharing, equity participation and increasing government participation in many forms. She also analyzed some of the problems
and the implications of this evolutionary process and suggested
future courses of action.
One of the earliest moves in this direction might have been the
joint venture of Shell, British Petroleum, and the Egyptian govern-

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

ment in 1911 by the company called Consolidated Oil Fields.7 More
recently, the predecessor of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the
old Turkish Petroleum Company, included in its administration both
pro rata distribution of crude oil among shareholders as well as the
concept of a "profit to be limited to a reasonable return on investment." 8 When investments are all made at one time the concept of
"time-weighted equity" is implicitly fulfilled without recognition
being paid to interest rates. Between 1958 and 1961, refinements of
the IPC agreements were attempted but the negotiations ceased before fulfillment. Two of the four areas of disagreement were profitsharing arrangements and equity participation by the government in
IPC. 9
Two general principles evolved in the post-World War 11 ventures
were:
...first, the generally accepted principle that an investor is entitled to a share in the benefits of a joint venture in proportion to his
investment in it; and second, that those owners wanting to obtain
more crude than they were entitled to by virtue of their share in
ownership should be able to purchase at least some additional
quantities at a preferential rate. 1 o
Although the investments in the Iraq Petroleum Company by each
parent was in proportion to the parent's equity, problems still
emerged among overlifters and underlifters. Arbitrary rules, including
the "5/7 rule," were developed for determining total production and
then allocating to overlifters.' 1
Penrose also made significant observations about the investment
processes:
Profits would be distributed to owners according to their equity,
but presumably any owner having better use for its investible funds
would dispose of part of its shares rather than restrict the total
investment by others in the producing company.12
Penrose later continued:
Thus, there are two conditions which must be satisfied before we
can conclude that joint ownership of a raw-material producing
affiliate by vertically integrated parents will not in itself retard the
rate of expansion of the affiliate: (1) The parents as a group must be
7. E. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing Countries: The International
Petroleum Industry 245 (1968).
8. Id.at 65.
9. Id.at 70.
10. Id.at 155.
11. Id.at 158-59.
12. Id.at 161-62.
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willing to invest in expanding capacity to the full extent necessary to
supply all the demands on the affiliate by all owners, and (2) the
price that parents wanting extra supplies must pay must not reduce
their demands on the affiliate. 1
Further on Penrose elaborated:
Given the vertically integrated nature of the parent Companies, there
is only one way of avoiding the difficulties discussed here and ensuring that the development of existing producing affiliates will not be
retarded by the desire of some owners to profit at the expense of
co-owners by raising the cost and restricting the availability of oil to
them. This is to allow all owners who want to take oil at 'cost' to do
so, providing that the overlifters either pay the interest and depreciation costs on the capital investment to the partners putting it up (as
is evidently done in Kuwait), or put up the capital themselves, including the investment in exploration and development attributed
(perhaps arbitrarily) to the amount of oil demanded. The former
arrangement would preserve the relation between the existing ownership shares and the distribution of capital investment, but would
change the distribution of oil to the parent Companies; the latter
would ignore ownership shares in both the distribution of capital
investment and the distribution of oil, which would then be determined for each Company by the proportion of actual investment it
contracted for, including an allowance, where appropriate, for
exploration expenditures.' 4
The apparent effect of this approach is to fulfill implicitly the intent
of a time-weighted equity approach without recognizing the mechanism itself.
In 1966, Enterprises des Recherches et d'Activities Petrolieres
(ERAP) reached an important agreement with the National Iranian
Oil Company (NIOC) wherein ERAP paid all exploratory costs. If oil
is found half the reserves would belong to NIOC, and ERAP would
lend NIOC development funds. Furthermore, ERAP could purchase
oil "at cost plus 2 percent of profits calculated on realized (not
posted prices)." 1
The repeated 50-50 splitting is significant,
although 50-50 had been used long before this agreement.
By 1966 ...shared ownership between very different types of
partners became more common-majors combined with independents, independents with each other, and either (or both) with
governments. In the under-developed countries particularly, governments often created joint ventures with private Companies. The
13. Id.
14. Id. at 163-64.
15. Id. at 75.
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majors have in general been reluctant to embark on joint ventures
with governments, but the pressures 1 6of competition have been
gradually eroding even their reluctance.
Penrose is more explicit about increased participation and a retreat
from wholly-owned subsidiary later on:
It (Jersey Standard) seems to have preferred to operate through
wholly-owned subsidiaries abroad, until recently an almost universal
characteristic of U.S. corporations in general. But in some areas this
is no longer acceptable to the local governments, and the Company
has bowed to the inevitable and accepts local government and
private participation in some
of its refining subsidiaries but very
1
rarely in producing affiliates. 7
Few U.S. independents operate independently outside of the United
States. Almost all of their exploration, development, and production
of crude oil is done jointly or in some kind of consortium. 1 8
Penrose noted one important characteristic in Libyan renegotiations. The government attempted to make it attractive for the firms
to accept the new conditions by creating some advantages for the
companies rather than just unilaterally announcing new conditions.' 9 Penrose suggested a future course of events with:
...the direct intervention of the governments of the producing
countries in the affairs of the industry is likely to become greater the
less successful are the attempts to stabilize the level of prices in the
near future and the greater the consequent danger to oil revenues. 2 o
Finally, Penrose made the cogent observation: "As the scope for
bargaining over financial gains decreases, however, matters of
'principle' are likely to gain in importance." 2 1
In discussing the developing controversy over "Equity Partnership
and Government Control" Penrose noted that producing countries
want to leave "the companies a 'fair return' on investment." ' 2 2 The
idea of fairness is crucial to the acceptance of the concept of this
adjustment mechanism because of its equity aspects. Penrose spoke
of "the principle of evolution" in concession agreements but she was
pointing the way rather than establishing actual guidelines. In establishing the framework for discussing the new proposal it should be
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 214, 225, 243.
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noted that "foreign Companies do not, by and large, invest
without
'2
hope of return commensurate with the risk undertaken. 3
With this brief historic background a la Penrose, the proposed adjustment mechanism is now ready for development and illustrative
application.
CURRENT APPLICATION TO SOURCE NATIONS

Applying the proposal to current problems with source nations
may help a reader "to feel" its potential application to a future
problem area after having been exposed to the brief historic background of the preceding section. In the introductory paragraph to a
study distributed in December 1969, Professor Hirschman of Harvard
University wrote:
The dispute between Peru and the United States over the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company is only one of a
monotonously long list of incidents and conflicts which call into
serious question the wisdom of present institutional arrangements
concerning private international investment. This paper will discuss

the principal weakness of these arrangements, with particular emphasis on political economy rather than on economics proper, and

will then survey a number of ways in which current institutions and
practices could be restructured. It is written against the backdrop of
rising nationalism and militancy in the developing countries, particularly in Latin America, and of an astounding complacency,
inertia, and lack of institutional imagination on the part of the rich

countries.2 4
When investors are faced with confiscatory nationalization, the
prospect of negotiating for an average rate of return should be appealing. For the same reason the average rate of return can provide a
guideline for future source nation contracts. The entry point to that
position, however, is the 50-50 concept. The source-nation could be
allocated one-half of the raw material output as its "inherent share."
A 50-50 division, as shown in the last section, has been appealing. In
the oil industry 50-50 had almost an emotional impact. 2 s The 50-50
approach intuitively feels of being a fair game, although here it is an
illustrative value. Nevertheless, most cultures have an illustration of
fairness along the lines of "let one child cut the cake and let the
other child select his piece." Such folklore enshrines the concept of
50-50 as being inherently fair.
23. Id.at 243.
24. A. Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why, Essays in International
Finance, No. 76 (Nov. 1969); Letter from A. Hirschman to D. Edwards, Jan. 21, 1970.
25. Penrose, supra note 7, at 65, 66, 75, 143, 204, and 215. See also B. Higgins, Economic Development (1968).
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An arithmetic example of the proposal is presented in Table 2.
Many criticisms could be made by industry specialists about this
example; it is presented as a teaching aid rather than a definitive
financial plan. In this example investment is made over a four year
period by the private sector. The total nominal investment is $2.4
million. The "total" interest rate, composed of a representative
market yield and an appropriate risk factor, is 20 percent. In the first
year there is no investment from previous years and column 2's entry
is zero. Nominal investment during year one is $.5 million (column
3) and, therefore, total nominal investment in the first year is $.5
million (column 4). For simplicity, accrued interest is entered at $. I
million (column 5). Accrued interest from previous years is zero
(column 6) and, therefore, total investment including accrued interest is $.6 million (column 7). Column 7 of year one then becomes
column 2 of year 2. The nominal investment of $2.4 million at the
end of the fourth year has an economic value of $3.8 because of $1.4
million of accrued interest, the sum of column 5 and 6.
Gross revenues (not in table 2) are assumed to start in the fourth
year and net revenues were realized in the fifth year at $.7 million
(column 8). Net revenues were split between the private sector investors and the source nation on a 50-50 basis. A token payment to
the Rest of the World of 5 percent started in the fourth year. An
amount equivalent to the cumulative nominal investment of $2.4
million was received by the investors during the seventh year. No
obvious theoretical economic argument is known for increasing the
return to the source nation at this time. For example, no economic
or business argument exists for changing the dividend policy of a
bank when cumulative dividends happen to equal the investment of a
very old savings account. Nor would the dividend policy of a stock
be influenced by this co-incidence of such accounting magnitudes.
However, the inhabitants of source nations might find much intuitive
appeal to increasing their share after the original investment had been
returned. But theoretical reasons can be advanced that it would be
appropriate to increase the source-nation's share once the investors
had achieved their cumulative target rate of return. Such economic
presentations would focus on economic rent. The second alternative
is chosen for illustrative purposes. In the tenth year the investors are
achieving the cumulative target rate of return and the absolute return
during that year is less than the previous year. Note that column 5,
annual accrued interest of $1.9 million and distribution to investors
is the same at $1.9 million in column 10. Also, note that during the
ninth year investors received $4.2 million which is more than the
$1.9 million of year 10. During and after the tenth year columns five
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and ten are equal. During the tenth year the rest of the world receives its first significant return. For this example, the source nation
and the rest of the world split the additional revenues, again on the
intuitive logic of a 50-50 split. Many other splits could have been
selected. If some considerations of a floor rate of profit would be
accepted then some of this economic rent might be earmarked for
that purpose. The peak of net revenues occurs during the eleventh
year. The peak absolute return to the investors was during the ninth
year. But, at some point in the future the return to the investors
would be less than the target rate of return as the productivity of the
reserves and technology declined. The peak year for the rest of the
world was the tenth and the source nation the next year. Many
options are open for discussion about distribution during the terminal years of output but these are left for later discussion.
The present framework could be used for new contracts in source
nations. When nationalization is threatened the proposal would have
to be modified. The accounting for past investment and the appropriate interest rates to use would be difficult, but not insoluble,
problems. The application to the high seas is much simpler. The
source nation and the rest of the world became one. The main problem would be of defining the area to be explored and developed.
Finally, the adoption of this proposal to current source nation
problems might coincide with some old investor groups selling their
rights to a new investor group, because relations had deteriorated to
a point where a new investor group was more desirable for both
short-run and long-run reasons. What is significant, moreover, is that
the old investor group could transfer ownership on a market basis
rather than by distress selling or acceptance of token payments.
TARGET RATE OF RETURN CALCULATIONS
As previously indicated, the target rate of return is composed of
two parts. The first part represents the general foregone alternative
use of resources, and is therefore a general market rate of interest.
This rate could be announced or calculated monthly or quarterly.
The development of the second part, the risk factor, is a more complicated calculation.
A first step might be to classify projects by various degrees of risk.
Another option would be to let investors bid on the risk factor and
let the lowest risk bidder win. A third option would be to set
maximum risk factors for each prospect and not "lease" a prospect if
the bids were all above the maximum risk factor. Table 3 is an
illustration of the first approach. Five risk categories are proposed.
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TABLE 3.- Risk Categories

Class

Type

1

2

In-field

Field

Development Defining

3
High

4
New Field
Low

Probability Probability

5
New
Country

Risk
Factor

0

30

50

1,000

10,000

Target
Rate of
Return
@12%

12

16

18

120

1,200

Type 1, in-field development, is the lowest risk. The risk factor
evaluation of zero suggests that in-field development is little different
from any other business investment. Although the value of zero is
pre-emptive, a risk factor could be assigned above that of a routine
investment. Investment for field defining carries a greater risk than
in-field developing and an illustrative risk factor of 30 is assigned.
New field development is divided into three types. First, new
fields are divided into high and low probability. A third category of
new field might be called new field in a new country. This category
would be the purest of wildcats and would carry a risk factor of
10,000. These risk factors increase the "market" interest rate, which
is assumed to be 12 percent for this example. The target rate of
return would then be 12 percent for in-field development. For a new
field with a high probability of success the target rate of return
would be 18 percent. The assumed "market" interest rate of 12
percent is increased by 50 percent. For the extreme example of a
new field, one in a new country, the target rate of return would be
1,200 percent. The latter target rate of return is derived from a 100
fold increase in the assumed market rate of interest.
The incentives in this approach to risk taking would tend to reduce some possible abuses. That is, an inverse relationship should
prevail between the risk category and the quantity of funds invested.
For example, no firm would commit billions of dollars in exploration
for total new fields in complete new countries. There is a logical
possibility, nevertheless, that a successful oil strike could be made
without the knowledge of source-nation inhabitants and that an investing group might then want to invest billions and thereby "beat
this game." But, this course of action is more likely a pure logical
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possibility. It is more than a little difficult to wildcat in complete
secrecy. Oil scouts earn a living finding out very detailed information
about each other's operations. By contrast, in-field developing could
be almost unlimited without significantly influencing the outcome
among investors, source nations, and the rest of the world because
the risk factor is low and may be zero.
Some would suggest a "profit floor" as well as a ceiling. 2 6 They
would argue that the target rate of return represents a ceiling
although the risk factor is "correct." Several options are open to
finance an approach towards a "profit floor," over and above the
normal tax considerations for losses. Some of the economic rent
could be earmarked for this purpose. Such earmarking would be
easier if an organization was administering the proposal. But funds
could be put in escrow for that purpose even if the proposal is
implemented as a guideline for individual projects by an international
accounting firm.
One approach towards reducing the absolute loss would be a
trade-off between the risk factor calculation and the percentage of
resources risked. For example, proposed category five, a new field in
a new country, is the highest risk classification. One option would be
to reduce the risk factor in direct proportion to the percentage of
funds risked. If investors preferred to take no risk then they would
only earn a maximum of the competitive interest rate. Their loss on
their investment would, therefore, be limited to the foregone alternative use of their funds during the project. Or, the investors might
decide to risk one half of their investment and correspondingly reduce the risk factor by one-half. The proportionality could be other
than direct but such variations are details at present.
It is only an intellectual baby step, and an accounting baby step as
well, to go from a no-loss of original investment to a "profit floor."
Besides making a trade-off on the amount of resources risked versus
the risk interest rate factor, it is equally simple to recognize a "profit
floor-trade-off." Instead of using a private investment rate of return,
as a general indicator of interest rates, the investor could prefer a
savers return on the investment as a profit. For example, going to the
opposite extreme of the risk-taking spectrum, to in-field development, the investors could be offered the savers rate of return, such as
3 or 4 percent, instead of the illustrative value of 12 percent. Because
the risk factor is assumed to be zero the investors would have a total
return of 3 or 4 percent. In some circumstances some investors might
accept this low return because of more effective reservoir engineering
26. Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin A merica and Why, supra note 24.
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or additional oil information. The suggested savers rate of return
could be financed out of economic rents from successful investments.
In general, the percentage of resources risked can be balanced by
reducing the risk factor. A nominal profit guarantee can be balanced
by reducing the market interest rate to a savers rate of interest. The
main point, however, is the flexibility of this general proposal so that
a very large number of preferences could be considered.
UNITED STATES EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The discussion so far has been, at least implicitly, concentrated on
foreign investment. The ideas could be applied to all investment in
natural resources, but some problems might be encountered if these
ideas were advocated for purely domestic investment in source
nations. When the discussion proceeds within a foreign investment
framework then one surprising result is that exploration and development in the United States will probably become relatively more attractive than development elsewhere. An increase is likely because it
is the only area where the "lucky" firm could earn a rate of return
above the average after allowance had been made for risk. Another
result might be the reduction of foreign investment in the U.S. by
foreigners if the new guidelines applied to these foreigners. But such
a reduction is not obvious if all rules change at the same time
throughout the world. Econometrically, it is almost impossible to
estimate the magnitude of the relative shift towards more attractiveness in United States exploration and development but the direction
is clear-an increase. A future historian would be amused to find that
a new international institutional arrangement could produce a desired domestic goal after the combined domestic tax and import
control programs had failed to deliver it.
RELATIVE DECREASE IN WORLD-WIDE OIL EXPLORATION
AND DEVELOPMENT
One long-run effect of widespread adoption of target rate of returns and eventual international redistribution of output (income)
would be a relative decrease in total world-wide investment in liquid
and gaseous hydrocarbons, in particular. The Oil & Gas Journal2 7
estimated, by its definitions, that at current consumption rates the
world oil industry has 54 years of supply and at increasing consumption rates over 20 years. With likely changes in technology the
industry might now have over 30 years' supply. It is difficult to
27. Forecastfor the Seventies, supra note 4, at 163.
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discover another industry which continues to invest heavily in this
type of inventory with a comparable magnitude already "on the
shelf." 2"8 Some would argue that the oil industry has overinvested.
Others would argue that the industry is seeking lower cost oil and
total figures on supply and investment are misleading. However,
limiting the rate of return on this type of investment would increase
the relative attractiveness of other investments not subject to constraints. Investment in other natural resources might increase because
one of the main comparative advantages of an oil executive is
analyzing this particular type of risk taking, i.e. exploration and
development. The shifting of investment away from oil is analogous
to the increased attractiveness of the United States for exploration
and development of natural resources in relation to the rest of the
world, where rates of return were limited. However, the investment
shift to other natural resources could be contracting for specialized
services. The net impact of this relative shift could be a slight increase in potential world-wide full employment GNP, because these
other investments must earn a greater return.
Another aspect of the present situation would be improved if the
rate-of-return-on-investment argument is accepted. Presently, firms
with "excess reserves" continue to search for new supplies, because
they fear that another firm will discover another Greater Burgan field
or another Greater Ghawar field with far lower costs than they have,
or that another firm will get better geographical distribution of supplies and be able to create the illusion of being a better long-run
supplier. 2 9 These fears would be reduced or eliminated with this
proposal. If most exploration and development is conducted by
various joint ventures then no single firm would have a comparative
advantage over other firms. It is likely for this reason too that investment in hydrocarbons would be reduced during the rest of this
century relative to a world in which hedging against various types of
risks would be more difficult.
REALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
At the present time the bulk of natural resource investment is in
hydrocarbons. If excessive investment in petroleum is taking place
for the reasons mentioned in the last section, then two economic
effects must be noted. First, the economic rate of return on investmen-t in oil is reduced. Or, if oil investment is reduced the economic
rate of return on hydrocarbon investment would be increased.
Second, if resources freed from oil investing are invested in areas
28. Adelman, supra note 1, at 68, 69, and 77.
29. Id. at 77, 103. Penrose, supra note 7, at 16, 172, 253, and 294.
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where both the expected and the actual rate of return on these
investments are higher than in oil, then overall economic growth will
be increased. It is appropriate to elaborate this analysis a little
further. If the additional investment in petroleum had a zero return
while investments elsewhere earned more than 10 percent then economic growth would be accelerated by this investment shift.
Penrose alluded to this possibility without really developing the
causal relationships:
...international firms can make greater contributions to the economic growth and development of all countries than they are now
making provided that some of the sources can be eliminated of

international discrimination and of conflict between their own interests and those of their parent countries on the one hand, and the

interests of other countries in which they operate on the other.
There is a danger that these conflicts will so reduce the international
acceptability of international firms that their potential contribution
will not be realized. 3 0
Penrose supplied other information that can be interpreted as supporting this variant of an economic-growth hypothesis.
Most of its (Jersey Standard's) foreign sources of oil, however, came
through acquisition and not as a result of exploration and discovery
3

by Jersey. 1
All of the majors have been diversifying their activities and expanding rapidly in fields outside the traditional production, refining,
and distribution of oil and products. The investment policy of Jersey

Standard has for some time emphasized "the finding and undertaking of profitable new opportunities, including several in fields not
directly related to petroleum," and most of the3 Companies seem to
have adopted a similar policy in varying degrees. 2
When the largest oil firm needed increased foreign reserves it generally bought them in an open market transaction rather than
through the "law of large numbers" in exploration. Oil firms have
recently aggressively diversified their investments. The significance of
these observations is that it was the expected rate of return that
probably influenced the decision makers to invest outside of oil and
the adoption of ideas similar to this proposal is likely to accelerate
past trends.
Penrose articulated her reasons for a decrease in oil-exploration
investment as follows:
30. Penrose, supra note 7, at 52.
31. Id. at 97.

32. Id. at 146.
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If crude oil could be bought as cheaply as it could be produced,
and if each Company could feel confident that it could contract for
and in fact receive at market prices the amount and qualities of oil it

wanted when it wanted them (with unexpected short-term surpluses
or deficits catered for by brokers or some sort of spot market), there
would be no reason for any firm to undertake crude-oil production
simply because the firm was engaged in the refining and sale of
products and needed crude as a raw material. 3 3
Another argument for a reduction of oil exploration investment
has been advanced by Adelman. He argued that for the industry the
maximum economic finding cost through the early 1980's is about 8
cents a barrel. He argued that the Persian Gulf reserve production
ratio is unlikely to decline from 25 to 20 during the next few years.
It might decline to that level if you make the following extreme
assumptions: ".

.

. no new discoveries,

. . .

no new technology, no

natural gas, no nuclear energy, a fast decline in European coal output, and static North African production." 3 4 Therefore, ".

.

. any-

thing more expensive (than 8 cents a barrel) is a gamble lost, a waste
of money, because additional oil could be had more cheaply by
further developing old deposits instead of finding new ones."'3 An
eight cent margin is a very narrow target to hit. The incentive for an
individual to advocate an approach with the properties of this proposal may be increasing daily. The old "invisible hand" may contribute to the general welfare with a little guidance.
A net advantage to this joint venture proposal is the potential
reduction in resources absorbed in future regulation. The present
trend is for more direct intervention by source nations in the administration of foreign investment. An appealing alternative course
of action must be presented, advocated, and accepted to prevent this
double waste. Resources would be consumed by the administrators
and the responders to the administrators. Assuming that the present
firms are relatively efficient, the comparison should be made between the future administrative interventions as against this type of
proposal. The potential power of this proposal is an appeal to relative
comparative advantages. The oil firms should have the comparative
advantage in combining inputs, in sequencing their use, and the same
advantages with outputs. The comparative advantage of the source
nations is their natural resources. The source nations should be
mainly concerned with the competitive pricing of all inputs and out33. Id. at 253.
34. M. Adelman, A Long-term Oil Price Forecast, 21 J. Petroleum Technology 1515,
1517 (1969).
35. Id.
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puts and with adequate accounting procedures to fulfill the intent of
the proposal in order to participate in profits. An open-book approach to these latter two conditions would most likely be insisted
upon by the rest-of-the-world nations. In many respects natural resource developers would become contractors with this proposal.
Most important, however, resources would be freed to be invested
elsewhere and another source of economic growth would be available.
Although it may be redundant to point it out again, firms gain
from economic growth and its acceleration. Firms are likely to accept this type of proposal because they are better off with this
proposal than any other likely prospect flowing from present developments.
SOME IMPLEMENTATION POSSIBILITIES
The original purpose of this article was to develop a proposal for a
set of guidelines to develop the resources of the high seas. The intellectual impetus developed for fulfilling the original goal overflowed into other areas. In refining the guideline proposal some ideas
for implementation emerged. The original thoughts on implementation were to avoid the creation of more big bureaucracies. For the
flavor of these bureaucracies read the following from the recent
Stratton report:
Limited Policing Functions for the Registry Authority
The Commission does not recommend that the International
Registry Authority be given initial policing functions. However, because we recommend that the Authority be empowered to cancel a
registered claim if the registering nation fails to discharge its obligations properly, the Authority must have the means to perform this
function fairly and with full knowledge of the facts. Accordingly,
the Authority should be empowered to inspect all stations, installations, equipment, and other devices used in operations under a
registered claim and to conduct appropriate hearings.3 6
At a conceptual limit only an international accounting firm is
needed to authorize and to validate the guidelines. Competitive
pricing of inputs and outputs would have to be included in the
instructions to an accounting firm. Potential economic rents could be
absorbed on an accounting basis by investing firms through overpricing any input and underpricing any output. However, it is likely
that net consuming nations would want more surveillance and supervision than is usually provided by an accounting firm.
36. U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the
Sea, A Plan For National Action 150 (Gov't Printing Office, 1969).
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Effective competitive pricing of inputs and outputs should reduce
any detailed intervention by a source nation or rest-of-the-world
nations in management decisions. A purpose of this proposal is to
simulate an environment of a competitive firm and a competitive
industry. A basic distinction should be recognized between this joint
venture approach and central planning. One of the most fundamental
problems of managing a centrally planned economy is the pricing of
inputs and outputs. At times central planners have been forced, as a
last resort, to use prices from the United States for giving directions
within their economies. These disruptions to effective management
are significant. U.S. prices do not adequately reflect either foregone
alternative uses of resources or the preferences in using them in a
particular planned economy. Given the present understanding of economics it is generally accepted that competitive pricing is the preferred guideline rather than setting prices arbitrarily or at random.
The Iranian consortium was sensitive to maintaining a level of
ouput satisfactory to its host government.' ' Thus, it is also likely
that the rate of production could become an issue among the investors, source nations, and the rest of the world. However, the range
for discussion and bargaining about quantities to be produced is
likely to be significantly smaller than the range between competitive
and monopolistic pricing of inputs and outputs. The quantity range
will reflect alternative internal rate-of-return calculations by the different parties. Therefore, once competitive pricing is established it
would be a small refinement to reach an agreement on a compromise
interest rate to indicate an acceptable rate of production given the
physical characteristics of a given oil field or other natural resource.
For non-petroleum natural resources the problems are likely to be of
an even smaller range for bargaining because the economic rents are
much smaller and precedents are more likely to have been established
sooner with petroleum problems. These considerations suggest that
the logical possibility of an international accounting firm to implement the proposal has only a small hope of prevailing.
A more likely method of implementation would be an international agreement among the principal consuming and producing
countries. Such an agreement would state that henceforth all international (non-domestic) investment in natural resources would
conform to a set of guidelines. These guidelines could be refined
annually and the interest rates and risk factors set monthly. Auditing
and advance planning could be conducted on a quarterly basis.
At the opposite extreme of only an international accounting firm
37. Penrose, supra note 7, at 160-61.
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would be the adoption and administration of the proposal by the
United Nations. Penrose, however, expressed extreme caution about
the United Nations and oil interests. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe has made only one penetrating analysis of the industry with its The Price of Oil in Western Europe (1955), according
to Penrose:
This Report created considerable annoyance among the oil Companies and it is widely stated that after it the UN was "warned off"
oil. This was reported by J. E. Hartshorn (p. 286), and has been
confirmed privately to me by a number of UN officials. It is in any
event true that since that time no serious analytical discussions of oil
economics (as contrasted with oil technology) or pricing have appeared in UN reports. 3 8
CONCLUSION
This article started as an inquiry into the possibility of establishing
a new institutional guideline to develop and distribute the natural
resources in and under the high seas. The haunting seminal question
was: Who owns the resources of the high seas? The inquiry led into a
proposal for the general development of world-wide natural resources
by foreign investors. The proposal outlines a new type of joint
venture. Investors would be attracted to explore and to develop
natural resources by a specified target rate of return which includes
any needed risk premium. When the investors have recovered their
initial investment and they are earning the cumulative target rate of
return, any additional return, assumed to be economic rent, is distributed to the entire world. This proposal blends conservative business incentives with liberal desires for redistribution of income.
The proposal also deals with the current claims of source nations.
Under most other proposals foreign investment is partially or wholly
confiscated. Adoption of this proposal offers investors a wider range
of options. Surprisingly, the proposal would increase the relative
attractiveness of the United States for exploration and development.
It might also reduce the amount of investment in petroleum over the
remainder of this century and, correspondingly, increase investment
in other natural resources. Furthermore, the shift of investment
funds might increase the potential full employment growth rate of
the world.
The proposal can be adopted to a wide-range of risk taking
preferences of various investors. Its breadth extends from a no-risk
savers return to a pure wildcat rate of return.
The relative simplicity of the proposal would decrease the amount
38. Id. at 185-86.
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of resources devoted to administration by contrast with other programs whose result would probably be the creation of various complex big bureaucracies.
Although the oil industry was primarily used to develop applications of the new proposal, the generality of the concept with respect
to natural resources was stressed. Higgins suggested that the new
rules of the game could significantly change the development of
natural resources in underdeveloped countries: "Reluctance to make
conditions attractive to foreign firms has left Brazil with only 1
percent of the world's iron ore market, although it has one-third of
the world's iron ore reserves."'3 9
By appealing to the motives and the relative comparative advantages of many diverse groups, this proposal for creating a new
institutional guideline might help to produce a more stable economic
and political environment over most of our globe. Finally, it answers
The Oil & Gas Journal's prophecy: "The cry of the seventies in the
producing countries
will be for 'participation,' and to a lesser degree
'nationalization', '4 ° and it does so with the recognition that equity
has an economic value too, if it induces stability in the political
environment.

39. Higgins, supra note 25, at 567.
40. Forecastfor the Seventies, supra note 4, at 202.

